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AN OPERATIONAL VIEW OF THE
By KARL S.

BLM

ORGANIC

AcT

LANDSTROM*

Public land law reform, that long-sought goal, has made a
big step forward. It is timely at this conference to consider the
details of the new Act,' for therein rather than in the policy declarations lies its true significance.
When the Honorable Wayne N. Aspinall addressed the 1962
White House Conference on Conservation, he closed with this
paragraph:
In summary, what I am saying is that Congress will continue
to equate conservation with wise use; will not put out of reach resources that may be required for our national continuance; and that
all the resources will be managed for the benefit of the many and
not the few

These well-chosen words offer a useful standard by which to judge
the merits of the new Act. They reflect the essence of "multiple
use" management of public lands and resources, a concept in
which I have long believed. They suggest the kind of reasonable
balance that should be the goal of laws and regulations enacted
for the use and disposal of public properties.
A crucial element, however, is missing in the summary of
Chairman Aspinall, although I am sure that he has emphasized it
at other times and places. I refer to the important question of the
timeliness of public land actions.
Congressman Aspinall at one time had thought that general
public land law reform, under a "joint effort" agreement with
President Kennedy, would soon be operative "in order to meet the
demands of the 1960's." 3 It now appears that some of the provi* Former Director, Bureau of Land Management, United States Department of the
Interior; Attorney at Law, Arlington, Virginia.
43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1782 (Supp. 1977) (this act is commonly referred to as the BLM
Organic Act).
Address by Congressman Wayne J. Aspinall, White House Conference on Conservation in Washington, D.C. (May 24, 1962), reprinted in HousE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND
INSULAR AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REvIEw COMMISSION, BACKGROUND AND NEED 1, 5 (Comm. Print 1964).
' Paper by Wayne J. Aspinall, presented at the Conservation Banquet, Utah State
University, Logan, Utah (May 3, 1963), reprinted in HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEw COMMISSION, BACKGROUND
AND NEED 30, 33 (Comm. Print 1964).
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sions of the new "organic act" may not be in full operation until
the 1980's.
Professor Carver's comprehensive treatment of the new
Act'-its general features, its congruities and incongruities in relation to other PLLRC recommendations, 5 and its differences
from other kinds of "organic acts"-has opened the way for me
to offer a specialized treatment of and reaction to the new Act.
Moreover, I believe that the timeliness and untimeliness of the
Act offer an appropriate theme.
I.

RECENT INSTANCES OF DELAYED ACTIONS

The energy crisis, like the environmental quality movement,
is one of a series of events that have focused attention on the
procedure, as well as the substance, of natural resource actions
taken by the government.
For example, consider the case of the Houston Oil and Mineral Corporation's 1977 attempt to acquire and rely on offshore
oil leases. On March 22, 1977, the Houston corporation placed an
advertisement in the Washington Post,' stating that it had invested $8.2 million in offshore leases after a federal district court's
order barring the lease sale had been overturned by a circuit court
of appeals, and after recourse to the Supreme Court had been
denied. The advertisement went on to say that the company had
completed plans, committed funds, obtained permits, and entered into contracts to drill, starting May 1, 1977, only to learn
that the same district court had, on February 17, 1977, declared
the lease sale null and void on account of irregularities in the
filing of required environmental impact statements. The company's statement ended with these probing words: "Now we ask
you-who's really withholding oil and natural gas from the American consumer? We'd like to know your opinion. Or better still,
let your Congressman and Senator know! We are ready when you
are."
I See Carver, The Federal Land Management & Policy Act of 1976: Fruition or
Frustration (this issue).
I PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970)
[hereinafter cited as PLLRC REPORT].
I Washington Post, Mar. 22, 1977, at 9, col. 1.
7Id.

,Id.
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This is an example of how poorly-integrated federal laws can
act to contradict each other. The practical application can be far
more cumbersome than the drafters of the legislation ever envisioned.
I hold no brief for Houston Oil, but I think it has a valid
point. Moreover, it is not the only form of industry to be hit by
such a twist of overlapping laws. A similar illustration may be
drawn from the difficulties confronting implementation of the
Geothermal Steam Act of 1970.'
The need for a geothermal leasing authority was recognized
in 1961 when the Office of the Solicitor of the Interior Department
held that the Department lacked the statutory authority to issue
geothermal leases. The necessary legislation to fill this gap in
authority was not enacted until December 24, 1970,1" however.
The Interior Department elected to subject the proposed rulemaking for lease authorization to the environmental impact
statement procedures. As a result, more than two more years
passed before the rules were finally issued in July of 1973," and
finalized in December of that year.12 The first sale of such leases
was held on January 22, 1974. The first leases were then issued,
some thirteen years after the need had first been examined by the
Federal Government. Despite the fact that the Geothermal
Steam Act expressly granted a "right" to the holders of
"grandfather rights" to have leases issued to them by meeting the
highest bid at a lease sale, some of these sales have yet to be held.
Commercial development of geothermal energy from public lands
has not yet begun.
The apparent cause of delay in both of these instances is the
environmental impact statement requirement of the National
Environmental Policy Act [NEPA].' 3 Perhaps the more accurately stated cause is the application of that requirement by the
courts and by the executive branch. And now, a fair question may
1 30 U.S.C.

§§ 1001-1025 (1970).
Id.
38 Fed. Reg. 19,748-79 (1973). See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

RONMENTAL STATEMENT FOR THE GEOTHERMAL LEASING PROGRAM,

(1973).
1138 Fed. Reg. 35,029 (1973).
13 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1970).
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be to ask how many new causes of delay will be created by the
new "organic act."
A.

II. PROVISIONS LIKELY TO CAUSE DELAY
Judicial Review

A policy declaration in the Act states that public land adjudication decisions should be subjected to judicial review as a
matter of policy. The word "adjudication" is not defined. This
policy statement, along with others in the Act, has been heaped
upon other relevant policy declarations contained in preexisting
statutes.
My difficulty with the policy statement is that it might be
interpreted as furthering the proposition, urged on the Congress
in earlier versions of the legislation, that not only "adjudicative"
decisions but also "discretionary" decisions should be subjected
to judicial review. Plainly, such a method is not required by current administrative law. Such a review provision would be in
derogation of the long line of precedent establishing that agency
decisions, when discretionary, are not subject to review by the
courts. Moreover, judicial review of discretionary land use decisions would appear to be contrary to the intent of Congress pursuant to section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
It is to be hoped that when Congress implements this policy,
it does nothing to restrict the current scope of discretion vested
in public agencies. Otherwise, substantial delays may occur in
the governmental decisionmaking process, and the authority and
independence of executive agencies will be undermined.
B.

Key Definitions

I have already spoken of the new Act's policy statement
which, compared with preceding public land laws, is somewhat
redundant and confusing. This is nothing peculiar to the 1976
Act, for public land legislation has often featured confusing and
conflicting declarations of policy and definitions of key terms.
The objectives of clarity and integration of key terms with others
of similar usage have not been achieved in the new Act. Unfortunately, the Act defines only some of its key terms; other words
and phrases are left undefined as they pertain to this specific
legislation. The obvious problem which is certain to flow from
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this deficiency is that such terms will have to be interpreted by
agencies and the courts, thus resulting in delays and indecision.
Among the undefined terms likely to cause difficulty are ones
such as "land use plan," "management decision," "tract,"
"equitable distribution," "equitable considerations," "chiefly
valuable," "adjoining landowners," "known mineral deposits,"
"no known mineral values," "proper land use," "the public interest," "national significance," "reasonably necessary," "equitable
to the United States and to the holders of grazing leases and
permits," "reasonable compensation," "to the extent practical,"
and "national resource lands." 4 This last term, "national resource lands," presents a particularly interesting history of development and implementation.
The Interior Department originally requested that the term
"national resource lands" be applied by statute so as to permit
the lands and interests in lands exclusively administered through
the BLM to be formally identified. In the interim, usage of the
term has been administratively authorized.
There was an earlier time when the term "national land reserve" had been similarly adopted, based on language used by
President Kennedy in his 1961 Natural Resource Message to Congress.' 5 Use of the term, however, was immediately discontinued,
largely because its use, without express statutory authorization,
was questioned by a Congressman.' 6
The only mention given to "national resource lands" in the
new Act occurs in an obscure provision, section 701(g)(6),' 7 which
" See note 1 supra.
' Address by President John F. Kennedy, Resources Message to the Congress, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 23, 1961).
" Comment of Congressman Wayne J. Aspinall during hearings before the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. The author was a witness appearing before the
committee and thereafter instructed Bureau of Land Management offices to discontinue
use of the term "national land reserve."
"1Section 701(g)(6) of P.L. 94-579, which has been condensed into 43 U.S.C.A. §
1701(b) (Supp. 1977), provided that:
(g) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as limiting or restricting the
power and authority of the United States or-

(6) as a limitation upon any State criminal statute or upon the police
power of the respective States, or as derogating the authority of a local police
officer in the performance of his duties, or as depriving any State or political
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provides for a limitation on the application of the Act with regard
to the functions of state and local governments. This location of
the term, not appearing elsewhere, may be viewed as only a drafting error in which the legislators failed to appreciate the existing
meaning of the term "national resource lands." I note, however,
that Senator Floyd Haskell of Colorado included the term in his
senate-floor remarks of March 22, 1977, describing his new bill,
S. 1074,'1 to establish a rangelands rehabilitation program.
C.

Land Use Planning

Professor Carver has stated in his presentation that the land
use planning process has replaced the old process of "land classification" as it was formerly prescribed in the Taylor Grazing Act 9
and expanded in the Classification and Multiple Use Act of
1964. 10 Multiple use management, both as a concept and as a
term of art, came under heavy attack in the PLLRC study, not
so much from the public or the land use professions as from the
Commission's staff. The Commission opted for use of the term
"dominant use,"'" illustrating that some resources may have to
be devoted to a principal use, and are not susceptible to management for competing and conflicting uses.
The fact that Congress has elected to continue the multiple
use management tradition demonstrates the continuing validity
and virility of the concept, however, notwithstanding its difficulty of application in some areas. The concept, first formulated
by Gifford Pinchot over seventy years ago, is still a workable
guide for land use planning. 22
This is not to say that the Act's land use planning provisions
will not cause difficulty, however, for there are complex details
with which administrative agencies must comply. Moreover, one
subdivision thereof of any right it may have to exercise civil and criminal
jurisdiction on the national resource lands; or as amending, limiting, or
infringing the existing laws providing grants of lands to the States.
" CONG. REc. § 4571 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1977).
" 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-316 (1970).
43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (1964).
" See PLLRC REPORT, supra note 5, at 48.
22 Keynote address by McArdle (The Concept of Multiple Use of Forest and Associated Lands-Its Value and Limitations) Proceedings, Fifth World Forestry Congress
(1960). But see Behan, The Succotash Syndrome, or Multiple Use: A Heartfelt Approach
to Forest Land Management, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 473 (1967).
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may reasonably expect the agencies' own lawfully promulgated
rules and regulations to add to the complexity. Questions arising
as to the adequacy of compliance with the statutory procedures
or concepts may well form a new cause for litigation similar to the
prolific environmental impact statement cases.
Management Decisions

D.

The language in the new Act prohibits, by implication, the
Department of the Interior from making a "management decision" until an authorized land use plan has been developed. Presumably, such a plan must also be formally adopted under the
Act's procedures. Therefore, few of these decisions may be expected to be forthcoming for a considerable period of time.
A peculiarity of the management decision provisions, as I
read them, is that no decision may be reconsidered, modified, or
terminated until the authorizing land use plan is first revised
under the full procedures specified in the Act. Omitted from the
Act are any provisions for the adjustment of management decisions where, for example, such items as variances may be contemplated by the authorizing land use plans.
This peculiarity may have resulted from a misunderstanding
of the usual relationship, in land use planning and zoning practices, between "plans," which are general in scope and detail, and
"decisions," which are more specific with respect to specified
times, places, and events. This feature of the Act- interlocking
plans and decisions into a single-level concept-will likely cause
confusion and, therefore, delay.
E.

CongressionalReview of ProposedAdministrative Actions

Under the Act, many administrative proposals must wait for
ninety days while Congress considers whether to adopt a concurrent (House and Senate) resolution of nonapproval. This does not
amount to a congressional veto power, and this is fortunate from
my perspective. Such a veto provision was originally passed by
the House committee, but the Joint Conference Committee re2
jected it in favor of the "nonapproval" concept. 1
The congressional-review provision will apply to actions such
2

43 U.S.C. §§ 1713(c), 1714(c)(1), (1)(2), 1722(b) (1976).
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as: (1) The exclusion of one or more "principal or major uses" for
two or more years on a tract of 100,000 acres or larger; (2) a
proposed sale of public lands when the tract is larger than 2,500
acres; (3) a proposed termination of a nonstatutory withdrawal;
(4) any proposed nonstatutory withdrawal exceeding 5,000 acres;
and (5) a proposal not to sell land under the Unintentional Trespass Act. 4
My own view of this development is that Congress should
have confined itself to taking legislative actions, not vetoes, as
prescribed by the Constitution. The veto power is constitutionally
set forth as an executive power, not a legislative exercise, although it may effectively be exercised through the appropriation
power. The "nonapproval" concept, while not amounting to a
veto as that power is ordinarily construed, is nonetheless an encroachment on traditional executive functions.
If it were concluded by the Congress that matters of this kind
could not be properly considered and decided by the executive
branch, then the preferable and more clearly constitutional
method of resolving the issue would have been for the Congress
to withhold the delegation of such discretion to the executive
branch agencies in the first instance. In this regard, I subscribe
to the views of Professor Kenneth Culp Davis,. who recently wrote:
I have the greatest respect for politicians, who perform the indispensable function of translating democratic desires into statutory
law. .

.

. But I also have respect for professional and scientific peo-

ple, who have an altogether different kind of skill. Successful government requires both kinds of skills. Those who have one kind must
be careful not to encroach improperly on the province of those who
have the other kind ...
When the factual component of complex rulemaking has been
worked over by appropriate professional people within an agency,
and when findings have been made on the basis of a record that
includes the results of the procedures of notice and written comments, I think it would be atrociousgovernment if Congress, on the
basis of political pressures, were to change the findings.25

Thus, there remains in the new Act what I believe is an
invalid delegation to the Congress of functions that should be, if
they are not in fact, reserved to the executive branch.
24

Id.

1: Letter from Professor Kenneth Culp Davis to the Honorable Elliott H. Levitas
(Nov. 24, 1976), reprinted in CONG. REC. H961-62 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1977).
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F.

Title Restrictions

The Act authorizes the Department of the Interior to place
in instruments of conveyance "such terms, covenants, conditions,
and reservations" as the Department "deems necessary to insure
proper land use and protection of the public interest."2 This
authorization is good and proper. It is a step that I personally
have advocated for a long time, although not in the phraseology
that has been adopted. However, I believe that confusion and
delay will occur because there is no authorization by which adjustments may be made in restrictions as time and conditions
change. Some type of a variance procedure needs to be provided.
In its absence, the title holders may have to seek private legislation or turn to the courts.
G.

Reserved Minerals

I was among those, like the late Senator Clinton P. Anderson,
who recommended that, when properties are being conveyed to
surface right purchasers from the United States, all of the mineral
interests should be reserved to the Federal Government. This
would be a simple and direct procedure which would avoid the
controversial process of evaluating each and every mineral estate
under conveyed lands. Moreover, it would assure reservation of
valuable mineral interests in the government for the forseeable
future, thus avoiding private speculation or errors in the mineral
evaluation process.
The Act has departed from this concept, establishing a new
and undefined standard of values.? I believe that this feature of
the Act, necessitating individual attention to mineral rights on
land conveyed for other purposes, is ill-advised and will result in
confusion and delay in establishing nonmineral usages.
H.

State and Local Government Land Use Restrictions

The Act provides that sixty days must elapse before a tract
may be offered for sale. This period purports to give the appropriate state or local governmental entities the opportunity to be
advised of the proposed land use change and enact or amend
43 U.S.C. § 1718 (1976).

Id.
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zoning laws or other regulations "concerning the use of such
lands.""
I believe that this provision ignores the elaborate procedures
elsewhere in the Act by which state and local governments are to
be informed and permitted to participate in the formulation of
land use plans. It also seems to rest on a mistaken notion of the
relation of state "police power" to the private land-using activities which may be taking place on public lands under rights
granted through mining claims, mineral leases, or other forms of
tenure .29
The sixty day waiting period is, I believe, unnecessary. Nothing in the Act, or in any other legislation of which this writer is
aware, prevents state or local governments from valid exercises
of the police power so as to embrace private interests in land
although that interest may have been obtained from the Federal
Government. It should not be assumed, although I have observed
state officials who believe it otherwise, that the exercise of the
police power must await complete alienation of title from the
United States.
This principle is illustrated by the operation of Oregon's
Mined Land Reclamation Act. 30 State officials have advised me
that the act is being enforced as to unpatented mining claims,
except in those areas where the state has surrendered all of its
legislative jurisdiction to the United States. Some other aspects
of private land use activities on federal base-title properties, to
which state authority is being routinely applied, include: (1)
Fishing and hunting regulations; (2) conservation of petroleum;
and (3) air and water quality standards.3
Professor Carver has written that Kleppe v. New Mexico 2
has had the effect of making federal jurisdiction under the property clause as broad as the legislative jurisdiction clause of the
Id. § 1720.
For a discussion of this problem, see Landstrom, State and Local Governmental
Regulation of PrivateLand Using Activities on Federal Lands, 7 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 77
(1974).
"

OR. REV. STAT. §§ 517.750-517.990 (1975).

Letter from Stanley L. Ausmus, Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries, to Karl S. Landstrom (March 9, 1976).
'

11 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
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United States Constitution. It should be remembered, however,
that Kleppe dealt only with wildlife situated on retained federal
lands. The impact of the case should not necessarily extend into
matters concerning state regulation of private property uses, although others may disagree.3 3 In sum, state and local governments should continually update their land use restrictions to
appropriately exercise their authority over private property interests within or on public land tracts.
I. Duplicative Law Enforcement Procedures
The Act requires that there be inserted in any use, occupancy, or development permit an authorization for its termination or suspension upon receipt of evidence that the permittee has
failed to comply with any applicable air or water quality standard. 31 This provision is right in intention, but wrong, I believe,
in application.
If the permittee merely has been charged with a violation,
but no conclusion has yet been reached on the allegation, then it
should be premature to levy a penalty. To revoke a permit without a hearing offends due process. On the other hand, if there has
been an evidentiary hearing and the fact of the violation has been
established, then, I believe, revocation of the permit represents a
second, and duplicative, penalty because the air or water quality
law presumably has already been applied.
J. Rulemaking
The Act does away with the public property exemption from
formal proposed rulemaking insofar as public lands, a form of
public property, are concerned. This has been done by way of the
Act's self-prescribed route of repeal by implication.35 However,
the rulemaking directive to the Interior Department fails to exempt the rulemaking process from the environmental impact
See generally Shapiro, Energy Development on the Public Domain: Federal/State
Cooperationand Conflict Regarding Environmental Land Use Control, 9 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW 397 (1976). See also Western Governors' Regional Energy Policy Office, Legal Analysis of Authority of the BLM to Promulgate Surface Mining Regulations for Unpatented
Mining Claims, reprinted in CONG. REC. S2202-06 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1977).
" 43 U.S.C. § 1732(c) (1976).
- Id. § 1740.
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statement procedures of the National Environmental Policy
6
Act.
The question arises as to how extensive will be the required
examination of rules by use of the impact statements. For example, if some or all of the proposed rules promulgated under the
Act are subjected to the impact statement analytical procedure,
will successive stages of the land use planning procedure each
require an impact statement? This, I believe, would be impractical, and the purposes of NEPA would be served by one exposure
of the rules to the impact statement procedures.
There was a time when Professor Carver and I advocated
extending the rulemaking process so as to include at least a part
of the function of exercising administrative discretion in public
land actions. 3 7 But under the Act's planning procedures this may
not be possible.
K.

Grazing Fees

The delay of one year in reaching a legislative settlement of
the grazing fee question has been understandable, inasmuch as
no acceptable solution was available before the Joint Conference
Committee. I think, however, that it is regrettable that the Congress has presented the Agriculture and Interior Departments
with what seems to be a hastily drafted and ambiguous study
directive.
I have suggested to the Grazing Fee Task Force that a determination needs to be made as soon as possible as to the interpretation of the Act's use of the singular in the words "value" and
"fee." Is it intended that the studies may recommend only a
single-level charge per animal-unit-month throughout the western states, or may the studies also consider multi-level charges
that are adjusted to differences in value?38
The task force has advised me that the study is proceeding
as though the Act warrants the latter interpretation. 9 There is
See note 13 supra.
Carver and Landstrom, Rule-Making as a Means of Exercising SecretarialDiscretion in Public Land Actions, 8 ARuz. L. Rv.46 (1966).
"I Letter from the author to the Grazing Fee Task Force, Range Management Staff,
U.S. Bureau of Land Management (Mar. 20, 1977).
11Statement to the author at a grazing fee hearing, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 25,
1977).
'
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reason to believe that the Act contemplated the consideration of
multi-level charges, because the study directive requires the two
Secretaries to take into account, among other things, "differences
in forage values."40
The Technical Committee to Review Grazing Fees was mistaken, I believe, in its November 15, 1976 report when it concluded that: "[blasically, the AUM and hence its general market value are the same from area to area since the grazing requirements of the animals and the yearly production cycle of the
ranches are maintained."'" I have submitted to the Grazing Fee
Task Force substantial evidence showing that the market values
per AUM of range forage do indeed differ markedly from place to
place or from condition to condition in the western states.4"
III.

A.

PROVISIONS LIKELY TO EXPEDITE ACTIONS

Interim Rules and Regulations

From an operational viewpoint, perhaps the most constructive action taken by the Congress is its authorization to the Agriculture and Interior Departments to proceed under the preexisting rules and regulations. The Act mandates that the Departments may use such rules and regulations "to the extent
practical" while new administrative decisions are being promulgated pursuant to the new Act.43 This conveniently avoids the
impasse which might have resulted had old rules and regulations
been repealed by the Act and new rules not yet been proposed.
B.

Repeal of Obsolete Laws

The timeliness, as well as the quality, of future public land
actions will benefit from the Act's repeal of numerous laws that
have been considered obsolete or superseded. This has been a goal
of at least one federal agency, the Bureau of Land Management,
almost from the day of its creation in 1946. Substantial effort was
made in the 1960's, based on an understanding between President
Kennedy and Congressman Aspinall." Progress was slowed, however, because of complicated issues presented by pending legisla43 U.S.C. § 1751(a) (1976).
' 42 Fed. Reg. 6,981-88 (1977).
, See note 38 supra.
:3 43 U.S.C. § 1740 (1976).
" See note 2 supra, at 119-22.
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tion, such as the interrelationship of existing legislation with the
then pending Wilderness Act.45 Indeed, the goal of streamlining
the nation's existing public land laws may be said to have been
the principal purpose of the PLLRC, its report, and now finally,
the 1976 Act.
This is not to say that the new Act has addressed all existing
legislation. Some laws, unfortunately in my view, remain essentially unaffected by the 1976 Act. For example, the Bureau of
Land Management, in its original "land law reform package,"
had proposed that the new Act address the Mining Law of 1872.46
Similarly, another proposal on the original slate was reform of the
"lottery" provision of the Mineral Leasing Act.47 The 197% Act
does not affect these laws, nor does it dispose of the Desert Land
Act,48 a piece of legislation that has been, in my personal experience, most disappointing. If repeal of the Desert Land Act does
not appear to be a realistic goal, at least attention needs to be
given to an upward adjustment of the notoriously inadequate
statutory price per acre of desert land.
C.

Inventories

The public land inventories should allow for expedited, as
well as better informed, land use plans and decisions. Such a
benefit may, however, take a long time to arrive.
A peculiarity of the inventory directive is that the Interior
and Agriculture Departments are required to give the resulting
information to state and local governments only to the extent that
it will be used by them in planning and regulating the uses of
nonfederal lands in proximity to public lands. This limitation
seems to have been based on a mistaken idea of the relationship
of state "police power" to private land use activities occurring on
federal lands.
Plainly, the state and local governments need up-to-date information regarding the federal lands and their resources, not just
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1964).
Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, §§ 1-16, 17 Stat. 91 (codified in scattered sections of
30 U.S.C.).
47 Id. § 181.
"m 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (1964).
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information regarding nonfederal lands in their vicinity. I hope
that the Departments will not construe this directive too strictly.
D.

Land Acquisition

The new land acquisition authorization should be advantageous. It should aid and expedite the progress of gaining access
to remote public lands and generally aid in public land management.
E.

Land Exchanges

The new Act authorizes monetary payments to be used in
equalizing land values.4 9 This should expedite such land exchanges and provide for more equitable results.
F.

Law Enforcement

Unauthorized land uses can be detected more easily and with
greater precision. Moreover, enforcement actions can be taken
under express statutory authority, 0 with federal criminal sanctions imposed, rather than relying on disparate and often imprecise state statutes.
G.

Advisory Councils

The new public land advisory councils should serve as more
effective focal points for general-purpose advice concerning public lands, replacing the hierarchy of boards that had been created
by the Taylor Grazing Act. Even though the district advisory
board provisions of the Taylor Act"1 were not repealed, there will,
of course, be only one grazing advisory board per district or equivalent geographic area. I do not see, therefore, that there is any
significant duplication between the general purpose councils and
the district boards. A more troublesome point, however, is the
omission from the advisory boards of any wildlife representative.
Perhaps this omission can be remedied by discretionary administrative action.
H.

Land Retention Policy
The forthright declaration that it is the policy of the Act that
, Id. § 1716(b) (1976).
Id. § 1733.
Id. § 315o (1970).
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public lands be retained whenever possible or necessary should
greatly reduce the time and attention that otherwise might have
been devoted to dealing with whether public lands should be
disposed of in wholesale blocks. The question had earlier been
raised in earnest when the National Livestock Committee on
Public Lands was organized in 1946.2
William Voigt, a long-time opponent of the movement, recently observed that "[t]he nation's public land seems safely
national. 5 3 Additionally, Professor Carver has stated that the
new Act makes it clear that lands should be retained unless specific program interests require their disposition. 54 Although the
intent of the new Act, by implication of its policy statement,
seems clear enough, I am not sure that its practical effect is as
clear as Mr. Voigt and Professor Carver maintain.
The Congress did not, for example, repeal the "pending its
final disposal" provision in section 1 of the Taylor Grazing Act.6 5
Similarly, the Congress has declined to adopt the Bureau of Land
Management's request that the term "BLM lands" be given a
more specific and descriptive statutory title. I conclude that the
Congress does not yet view the "BLM lands" as a necessarily
permanent land management system. From my own viewpoint, I
am not entirely dissatisfied with this result. There are enough
inadequacies in the new Act and in the other related statutes, or
at least in their current operation, to cause me, and perhaps
others, to look with less disfavor upon the possibility of conveying
some of the lands to the states and others to national forests,
national parks, and wildlife refuges.
I.

Mining Claim Recordation

Among the proposals for mining law reform included in the
BLM's original 1949 statement was one that would have required
recordation of mining claim locations and of annual assessment
work in the district land offices. 56 Now, after twenty-eight years,
2
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(1976).
.,Id. at 325.
" Carver, Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976: A Summary, 9 RoCKY
MTN. MIN. L. NEWSLETrER 2 (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
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the first part of this proposal has become law. In the interim, I
have become convinced that a better solution would be to have
all filings made in the local office of record. This provision, I
believe, will avoid confusion which may arise from the duplicative system of filing in both the local and district offices.
The new provisions, including the penalty imposed for failure
to file, will go far toward accomplishing the original objectives of
the BLM's proposals. Those goals were: (1) To expedite genuine
mining development; (2) to prevent interference with nonmining
uses; and (3) to reduce the extent of unauthorized use in the guise
of mining locations.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Within the theme of these comments, it is not the policy
declarations, but the details affecting operational effectiveness
and timeliness of actions, by which the new Act has been examined. For that matter, the policy declarations themselves may
turn out to be a source of confusion in that they have been heaped
upon existing congressional policies without provision for reconciliation of the new policies with the old.
On the basis of Chairman Aspinall's 1962 standards, the new
Act's provisions seem to meet the requirement that conservation
be regarded as a wise use. The resources will undoubtedly be
managed for the benefit of the many and not for the exclusive or
undue advantage of the few. The sound tradition of multiple use
will be continued.
The indication to me, however, is that these objectives will
be attained only slowly. Public land resources which are currently
needed may be slow in being made available.
Oliver Wendell Holmes is quoted as saying: "I find the great
thing in this world is not so much where we stand but in what
direection we are moving." In the Holmesian sense, we are moving in the right direction, but the rate of progress has been painfully slow. On the basis of practical effectiveness and the necessity of taking timely public land actions, the new Act may prove
to be wanting.
There are various ways to implement the Act to help avoid
the possibility of confusion and delay. One important step would
be to limit the applicability of the environmental impact state-
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ment process to a single stage of implementation such as, for
example, only after rules and regulations have been promulgated.
Whatever the practical effect of the Act and its application,
need
to deal realistically with it, recognizing its limitations
we
and seeking to minimize their impact on the process of land use
planning.

